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ments. Certainly the statute cannot mean that the implication is to
be derived from outside circumstances and conditions, for that would
in no way have altered the method employed before the statute was
passed. It is submitted that the confusion present in the cases since
1947 is the result of a conflict created by the statute as it was finally
enacted. This conflict arose because a literal interpretation of the section would have been in direct contradiction to the inherent nature
of the spoken or written word, and a liberal interpretation would
have nullified the provision. The courts, in an attempt to reconcile
these two extremes, and still arrive at a just determination on each
occasion, resorted to language which was, in essence, declaratory of
prior law but which, because of an awareness of the statute, was
couched in confusing and misleading terms. It is further submitted
that the practical solution lies in legislatively eliminating the present
problem from the provision. A re-drafting may be necessary in order
to retain advances made under it in other directions, 51 but no attempt
should be made to set an arbitrary standard for ascertaining the
effect of words. This is an area for the exercise of administrative
and judicial discretion, and more reliance should be placed upon the
courts to balance the conflicting interests and to obtain substantial
justice according to the demands of each dispute.

M
A

PROPOSAL FOR COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN NEw YORK

Introduction
In essence, negligence is the doing of an act without care, or the
failure to perform an act, the performance of which is dictated by
care. The degree of care to be exercised in a given factual situation
is commensurate with the danger to be avoided.1 Negligence is actionable only where an injured plaintiff shows: that a duty was owing
by the defendant to him to exercise care; 2 an act or omission whereby
defendant violated that existing duty; 3 that the defendant's negli3' An example is the principle that an anti-union speech by the employer
may not be used as a motivating factor for subsequent alleged anti-union activity on the part of the employer, if such speech is non-coercive in character.
Pittsburgh S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 180 F. 2d 731 (6th Cir. 1950), aff'd, 340 U. S.

498 (1951).
I Barbato v. Vollmer, 273 App. Div. 169, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 528 (3d Dep't
1948).
2 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
3
Johnson v. City of New York, 208 N. Y. 77, 101 N. E. 691 (1913).
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gence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury; 4 and the minority
rule in a jurisdiction such as New York, that plaintiff himself was
free from contributory negligence. 5
The origin of the doctrine of contributory negligence is generally attributed to the early English decision of Butterfield v.
Forrester.6 The significance and effect of this decision is that for the
first time, it was expressly held that a party, though injured by virtue
of the negligence of another, may be barred from recovering damages
therefor, if he himself has contributed to the cause of his injury.
Contributory negligence has been defined to be that "... . conduct for
which plaintiff is responsible, amounting to a breach of the duty
which the law imposes upon persons to protect themselves from injury, and which, concurring and co~iperating with actionable negligence for which defendant is responsible, contributes to the injury
complained of as a proximate cause." 7 A contributorily negligent
plaintiff is barred from recovery, irrespective of the degree of contribution.8 The rule, although reasonable in most instances, may
work an injustice in the situation where the plaintiff's contribution
to his injury is only slight. In such a case, the doctrine may be considered harsh and inequitable, since the defendant, who in the greater
part has caused the plaintiff's injury, is excused from all liability.
In 1842, the English courts qualified the rule of contributory
negligence by establishing the tenet of "last clear chance." 9 Where
the rule applies, the plaintiff's negligence is deemed to be noncontributory, and thus no bar to his recovery from a negligent defendant. It applies in the situation where the plaintiff's negligence
has placed him in a position of peril, of which the defendant is aware,
but the defendant nevertheless fails to exercise the requisite care to
avoid the consequences of plaintiff's negligence? o Since the defendant had the last opportunity to avert the accident, his negligence is
deemed the proximate cause of same, while plaintiff's is merely remote. The doctrine does not apply, however, unless the plaintiff's
'Saugerties Bank v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 236 N. Y. 425, 141 N. E.
904 (1923).
5Haley v. Earle, 30 N. Y. 208 (1864).
6 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K. B. 1809) (plaintiff, on horseback,
riding unreasonably hard on highway, collided with a pole that defendant had
placed across part of said highway).
7 45 C. J. 942 (1940).
8 Reynolds v. Third Avenue R. R., 8 Misc. 313, 28 N. Y. Supp. 734
(C. P. 1894).
9Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 546, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Ex. 1842) (plaintiff wrongfully left his donkey fettered on highway, and defendant, racing in
a wagon on said highway, carelessly crashed into it).
10 Elliott v. New York Rapid Transit Corp., 293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. 2d
86 (1944). "Were this not so, a man might justify the driving over goods left
on a public highway, or even over a man lying asleep there, or the purposely
running against a carriage going on the wrong side of the road." Davies v.
Mann, supra note 9, at 549, 152 Eng. Rep. at 589.
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peril becomes known to the defendant in time for him to avoid the
accident. 1 The doctrine has been extended in New York so that a
defendant need not have actual notice that a specific person is in
peril; it is sufficient merely that defendant be aware that someone is
in peril.' 2 The rule has been held to be inapplicable where the negligence of the injured party is contemporaneous and active up to the
very moment of an accident, thus contributing to the cause of such
accident.' 2 The doctrine of contributory negligence, as thus qualified,
became entrenched in the common law, and has survived even to the
present era.
Today, as a practical matter, juries have taken it upon themselves
to mitigate the strictness of the rule, by overlooking it in certain cases.
This oversight is based on their sympathy for an injured plaintiff
who, because of a technical rule of law, is denied all recovery, and
also, when the jury knows, or suspects, that the "real defendant" is
an insurance company. The harsh and uncompromising nature of
the rule of contributory negligence, especially in cases where the
plaintiff is only slightly at fault, and the bold circumvention of its
mandate by juries, exemplified the need for, and motivated the enactment of, appropriate legislation.
The stage was thus set for the intervention of "comparative
negligence" 14 -the benefactor of negligent plaintiffs. Today, by statute in five states, the doctrine is applied to the general law of negligence. 15 The rule admits the existence of a plaintiff's contributory
negligence, but instead of barring a recovery as it would at common
law, it merely authorizes a reduction of damages in proportion to the
fault attributable to the plaintiff. These statutes, though with a common purpose, vary in their application.

"Wheelock v. Clay, 13 F. 2d 972 (8th Cir. 1926); Woloszynowski v.
N. Y. C. R. R., 254 N. Y. 206, 172 N. E. 471 (1930); see Srogi v. N. Y. C.
R. R., 247 App. Div. 95, 286 N. Y. Supp. 215 (4th Dep't 1936).
12 Chadvick v. City of New York, 301 N. Y. 176, 93 N. E. 2d 625 (1950).
'3 Panarese v. Union Ry., 261 N. Y. 233, 185 N. E. 84 (1933) ; Donald v.
Heller, 143 Neb. 600, 10 N. W. 2d 447 (1943); Hughes v. Omaha & Council
Bluffs St. Ry., 143 Neb. 47, 8 N. W. 2d 509 (1943).
14 See PRossER, TORTS 403 (1941); Campbell, Ten Years of Comparative
Negligence, [1941] Wis. L. REv. 289; Mole and Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 17 CoRNELL L. Q. 333, 604 (1932); Philbrick, Loss Apportionient in Negligence Cases, 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 572, 766 (1951); Prosser,
Comparative Negligence, 51 MicH. L. REv. 465 (1953); Turk, Comparative
Negligence on the March, 28 CHI-KENT REV. 189, 304 (1950); Whelan, Comparative Negligence, [1938] Wis. L. Rav. 465; Note, 17 NFM. L. BuLL. 68
(1938); Comment, 5 WAsH. & LaE L. REv. 147 (1948); 20 Miss. L. J. 99
(1948); Note, 114 A. L. R. 830 (1938).
5N
Nebraska, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Mississippi, and Georgia. The rule
is also applied on the federal level under a statute similar to that of Mississippi.
See 35 STAT. 65 (1908), 45 U. S. C. § 53 (1946) (FELA), Norfolk &
Western Ry. v. Earnest, 229 U. S. 114, 122 (1913).
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Comparative Negligence Statutes
Nebraska
The statute as enacted in Nebraska, provides that ...
contributory negligence -shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence of the defendant
was gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in
proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to
the plaintiff... ," 16 In construing this section, the court, in Morrison
v. Scotts Bluff County,17 condemned as erroneous, a trial court's instruction to the jury, which purported to permit a proportionate recovery of damages, even if the jury found that the plaintiff's negligence was equal to, or greater than that of the defendant. In an
effort to establish a uniform construction, the court laid down the
rule to be that, "[i] f, in comparing the negligence of the parties, the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff is found to exceed in any degree that which under the circumstances amounts to slight negligence,
or if the negligence of defendant falls in any degree short of gross
negligence under the circumstances, then the contributory negligence
of plaintiff, however slight, will defeat a recovery." 18 A contributorily
negligent plaintiff may recover some damages, but only when his fault
is slight and defendant's gross, in comparison therewith. Notwithstanding the court's clear and concise explanation of the statutory
guideposts, it seems that the difficulty experienced in the later decisions of properly applying it to the varying factual situations, stems
from the inherent complexity of the statute itself. Since a statute is
only as effective as its adaptability permits, this law leaves much to
be desired. The following illustrations will indicate the confusing
effect that the statute has had upon the judicial process.
An instruction to the jury was held, on appeal, to be confusing,
because, with reference to establishing the comparison between slight
and gross negligence as contemplated by the statute, it purported to
place this burden upon the defendant. The court ruled that the comparison was for the jury to make. 19 It was similarly held to be
prejudicial error for a trial court to instruct the jury that plaintiff
may recover "... . provided you ... [find] that the... [defendant]
was guilty of gross negligence as compared with the negligence of
the plaintiff .... ,, 20 The court ruled that the statutory comparison
is to be made between the gross negligence of defendant, and the
16NEB. IEv. STAT. §25-1151 (1943).
17 104 Neb. 254, 177 N. W. 158 (1920).

Is Ibid.

19 Murray v. Pearson Appliance Store, 155 Neb. 860, 54 N. W. 2d 250
(1952).
20 McMullen v. Nash Sales Co., 112 Neb. 371, 199 N. W. 721, 722 (1924).
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slight negligence of plaintiff. 21 An instruction, based upon the contention that before the statute becomes operative, it must appear that
the plaintiff's negligence was slight without respect to the degree of
negligence on the part of the defendant, was criticized on appeal. The
appellate court held that "slight" and "gross" as used in the statute
are comparative terms, and the negligence of the parties should be
compared, one with the other, in determining questions of slight and
gross negligence.2 2 Where an instruction assumed the gross negligence of defendant for the purpose of the statutory comparison, it
was held erroneous for the reason that the negligence of both parties
must first be found, and then the statutory comparison is implemented
to determine whether
a plaintiff is entitled to recover sonic damages,
23
or none at all.

Where the evidence is conflicting or contradictory, the negligence of the parties, and the degrees thereof after. comparison, are
issues for the jury to determine, and if amply sustained by the evidence, its verdict will not be interfered with by the court.2 4 However,
in allegedly proper cases, the court itself has assumed the prerogative
of comparing the negligence of the parties. Thus upon defendant's
appeal, the court has directed a dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, on
the ground that since the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence more than slight as a matter of law, the comparative negligence
statute is inapplicable. 25 Upon the same ground, the trial court has
been sustained in denying plaintiffs' recovery, by the direction of a
verdict for the defendant.26 It has also been held proper for the trial
court, if the evidence permits, to instruct the 2jury that defendant was
guilty of gross negligence as a matter of lawY.
21

Ibid.

22
Roby v. Auker, 151 Neb. 421, 37 N. W. 2d 799 (1949).
23
Pratt v. Western Bridge & Constr. Co., 116 Neb. 553, 218 N. W. 397
(1928).
24 Kipf v. Bitner, 150 Neb. 155, 33 N. W. 2d 518 (1948) ; Halliday v. Raymond, 147 Neb. 179, 22 N. V. 2d 614 (1946); Giles v. Welsh, 122 Neb. 164,
239 N. W. 813 (1931).
25 See Buresh v. George, 149 Neb. 340, 31 N. W. 2d 106 (1948)
(at night,
on a well-lighted street, plaintiff crashed his car into the rear of defendant's
parked truck on which the tail light was off) ; Dickenson v. Cheyenne County,
146 Neb. 36, 18 N. W. 2d 559 (1945) (plaintiff, driving on defendant county's
highway on foggy night, failed to see the last intersection and drove into ditch
at dead-end of highway); Chana v. Mannlein, 141 Neb. 312, 3 N. W. 2d 572
(1942) (plaintiff's truck was approaching bridge, defendant's truck leaving it.
Plaintiff, although having observed defendant's truck, swerved to the center of
the highway to enter the bridge, and collided with defendant's truck).
26 See Wertz v. Lincoln Liberty Life Ins. Co., 152 Neb. 451, 41 N. W. 2d
740 (1950) (plaintiff was washing windows without a safety belt, as defendant
had failed to provide any safety devices; and plaintiff fell from the 4th floor) ;
Travinsky v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 137 Neb. 168, 288 N. W. 512
(1939) (plaintiff stepped from the sidewalk into the path of defendant's approaching street car, which failed to stop).
27 See Pierson v. Jensen, 150 Neb. 86, 33 N. W. 2d 462 (1948)
(plaintiff
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The fact situations, in the cases where the court has refused to
rule that plaintiff's negligence was more than slight as a matter of
law, do not seem so radically different from those wherein it does so
rule, so as to warrant apt reconciliation. 2 8 On the basis of the foregoing decisions, the statutory comparison seems to be applied or not
purely at the whim of the court. The manipulation of the tenuous
condition precedent to plaintiff's recovery, i.e., slight negligence, is
the apparent cause of the court's inconsistent rulings. Upon one occasion, the court refused, at the request of a defendant's counsel, to
define the terms "slight" and "gross." Upon appeal, it was held not
to be error, as the court quipped: "Any one of common sense knows
that slight negligence actually means small or little negligence, and
that gross negligence means just what it indicates, gross or great negligence." 20 This would serve to indicate that the court is itself
either puzzled as to the meaning of the terms, 0 or is reluctant to
admit the truly uncertain scope of slight contributory negligence,
within the meaning of the statute.
In reviewing the cases, it seems that the "gremlin" in the
Nebraska statute is the floating standard-slight negligence, and a
clarification of the statute would be in order. The merit of the statute
lies in its attempt, at least in form, to strike at the very heart of the
injustice of the rule of contributory negligence, by allowing a "mitigated damage" recovery to the slightly negligent plaintiff.
South Dakota
This statute 31 is identical with that of Nebraska, and thus the
South Dakota courts in applying it, have presumed that the legislature
intended that the former state's construction thereof be likewise
adopted. 2 In groping for an explanation of the statute, and for some
crashed his car into the rear of defendant's truck, which had been parked at
night, without rear signals, and partly protruding onto the highway).
28 See Thomison v. Buehler, 147 Neb. 811, 25 N. W. 2d 391 (1946)
(plaintiff, who had been working on the highway, was standing in the middle of the
road at night, oblivious of oncoming traffic, and defendant's car crashed into
him); Chew v. Coffin, 144 Neb. 170, 12 N. W. 2d 839 (1944) (plaintiff, walking
upon public sidewalk, began to read from book, and defendant, backing car
from driveway onto the highway, collided with plaintiff) ; Anderbery v. Katz,
142 Neb. 872, 8 N. W. 2d 207 (1943) (intersection automobile collision, where

plaintiff reached the intersection first) ; Sgroi v. Yellow Cab & Baggage Co.,
124 Neb. 525, 247 N. W. 355 (1933) (plaintiff alighted from trolley car onto

safety zone, then stepped into path of a taxicab).

29 Monasmith v. Cosden Oil Co., 124 Neb. 327, 246 N. W.
30 "...
[C]onfusion resulted by engrafting this doctrine

623, 625 (1933).
[of comparative
negligence] on our jurisprudence by statute." Patterson v. Kerr, 127 Neb. 73,
254 N. W. 704, 705 (1934); see Kelso v. Seward County, 117 Neb. 136, 219
N. W. 843, 844 (1928) (". . . an abstruse statute . . .
3' S. D. Laws, c. 160 (1941).
32

See Roberts v. Brown, 72 S. D. 479, 36 N. W. 2d 665, 669 (1949) (con-
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criteria upon which to base their own decisions, the courts have been
unable to glean any fixed rule from the reported decisions of
Nebraska. 33 Specifically, they have considered the floating standard
-slight negligence-an immovable obstacle to the efficient workability
of the statute. However, the courts did undertake to define slight
negligence according to its ordinary meaning as found in the dictionary, to wit, "small of its kind or in amount; scanty; meager." 34 By
the process of comparison, therefore, the disparity between the
quantum of defendant's
negligence and that exhibited by the plaintiff,
35
must be extreme.
The identical statutes of Nebraska and South Dakota, and the
decisions applying them, have failed to provide any semblance of a
usable yardstick. The courts must content themselves with that elusive
epithet--"slight" negligence-and
attempt to elucidate its meaning in
36
forthcoming cases.
Wisconsin
The Wisconsin statute provides that "[c] ontributory negligence
shall not bar recovery ... if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to the amount
of negligence attributable to the person recovering." 37 By the provisions of this statute, a plaintiff who is responsible for 49 per cent
of the total causal negligence is entitled to a recovery of 51 per cent
of the total damages that he has sustained. However, if a plaintiff
is found to have been negligent to a degree of 50 per cent or more,
he recovers nothing. Questions dealing with the negligence of the
parties, and the degrees thereof, are for the jury to determine,3 8 unless the negligence of each party is of precisely the same kind and
character.3 9 Similarly, a jury's verdict will not be disturbed by the
40
court, unless the percentages found are grossly disproportionate.
In proper cases, the court, on appeal, has barred a plaintiff's recovery
by ruling that his negligence was equal to, or greater than, that of
defendant's as a matter of law. 41 Generally, however, the verdicts of
curring opinion); Friese v. Gulbrandson, 69 S. D. 179, 8 N. W. 2d 438, 441
(1943).
33 See
34 See

Roberts v. Brovn, supra note 32, 36 N. W. 2d at 667.
Friese v. Gulbrandson, supra note 32, 8 N. W. 2d at 442.
35 Ibid.
36
37 See note 34 supra.

WIs. STATs. § 331.045 (1951).
See Bent v. Jonet, 213 Wis. 635, 252 N. V. 290 (1934) ; McGuiggan v.
Hiller Bros., 209 Wis. 402, 245 N. W. 97 (1932).
39 See Piesik v. Deuster, 243 Wis. 598, 11 N. W. 2d 358 (1943).
40 See Gauthier v. Carbonneau, 226 Wis. 527, 277 N. W. 135 (1938).
41
See Dinger v. McCoy Transp. Co., 254 Wis. 447, 37 N. W. 2d 26 (1949)
(plaintiff improperly attempted to make a left turn in his car before defen38
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juries, acting under the authority of the comparative negligence statute, have been stable and consistent. The few highly disproportionate
verdicts that necessitated reversal on appeal, may be explained by
reasoning that a verdict is only as intelligent as the jury that renders
it, and that a jury is only as honest and dependable as its individual
members. An obviously over-industrious jury, on one occasion, returned a verdict assessing plaintiff with 31342per cent of the causal
negligence, and defendant with 683 per cent.
The merit of the Wisconsin judicial process may be attributed
to its consistent utilization of the special verdict in conjunction with
the application of the comparative negligence statute. Either party
to the suit may, upon request, require that the jury return a special
verdict.43
By virtue of the separate and distinct findings, a court may
readily determine the grounds upon which the jury apportioned the
respective degrees of negligence of the parties, and review them intelligently on appeal.
The Wisconsin statute appears to be meeting with success in its
application to the varying fact situations. The major drawback is
the measure of damages which are recoverable. Specifically, a plaintiff who is found to be 49 per cent negligent may recover 51 per cent
of his total damages, whereas a plaintiff, only a shade more at fault,
namely, 50 or 51 per cent, may recover nothing. This is unreasonable,
and even resembles, in a sense, the theory of contributory negligence,
viz., "all or nothing." This sharp division of "more than half the
damages or nothing," around the fifty per cent mark is too arbitrary
to be equitable.
Mississippi
The comparative negligence statute of this state provides that
.contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but damages
shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the person injured. . .. ,,44 Under the provisions of this statute, a plaintiff who has been found to be 99 per cent
contributorily negligent may nevertheless recover 1 per cent of the
total damages he has sustained. A plaintiff is barred from all recovery only when his negligence is the sole proximate cause of his
injury.45 Thus, the direction of a verdict for defendant on the ground
dant's bus crossed the intersection) ; Hustad v. Evetts, 230 Wis. 292, 282 N. W.
595 (1938) (plaintiff-milkman stepped from left side of delivery truck without first looking for traffic).
42 See Gunning v. King, 249 Wis. 176, 23 N. W. 2d 602 (1946).
43 See Wis. STATS. §270.27 (1951).
44 Miss. CoDE ANN. § 1454 (1942).

45 Stewart v. Kroger Grocery Co., 198 Miss. 371, 21 So. 2d 912 (1945)
(plaintiff, employee of defendant's grocery store, attempted to open swinging
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that plaintiff was grossly negligent was held improper, since the jury
might have found defendant negligent, in which event the plaintiff's
action would not have been barred, only his damages diminished in
proportion to his fault.40 Similarly, an instruction that the jury
should diminish damages according to the gross negligence of the
plaintiff was held erroneous for the reason that the question of plaintiff's negligence was for the jury to determine, 47 and only thereafter
would a proportionate reduction of same be proper. An instruction
that contributory negligence is "no. defense in this case" was held
to be error, since it is a partial defense, and the48 instruction as given
precluded the jury from diminishing damages.
The court may not, of its own volition, instruct the jury to compare the negligence of the parties, but may do so only upon the request of one of them. 49 Upon an appeal to determine whether or
not a verdict was excessive, the comparative negligence of the parties
could not be considered for that purpose, since at the trial neither
party requested an instruction pursuant to the comparative negligence
statute. 0 Similarly, where neither party invoked the statute, but
the jury nevertheless did reduce damages, upon appeal, the court refused to disturb the verdict since the statute had not been invoked,
and therefore, the comparative negligence of the parties could not be
considered. 91 Ordinarily, where comparative negligence is applied,
the negligence of the parties and the ultimate liability 92 are questions
for the jury to decide.53 However, if the verdict appears to be grossly
inadequate, the court, on appeal, will promptly remand for a hearing,
solely on the issue of damages. 4 In like manner, although the court
is itself reluctant to apportion, it will not hesitate to do so where it
clearly appears that the jury has failed to properly diminish damages
in proportion to plaintiff's negligence. 5
door by placing a long box against door; it rebounded off the door and injured
him).
6 McClellan v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 204 Miss. 432, 37 So. 2d 738 (1948)
(peremptory instruction); cf. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cosnahan, 105
Miss. 615, 62 So. 824 (1913).
47McCollum v. Thrift, 156 Miss. 236, 125 So. 544 (1930)
(peremptory
instruction).
48 Waterford Lumber Co. v. Jacobs, 132 Miss. 638, 97 So. 187 (1923).
49Lindsey Wagon Co. v. Nix, 103 Miss. 814, 67 So. 459 (1915).
50 Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Merritt, 194 Miss. 794, 12 So. 2d 527
(1943); Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 194 So. 596 (1940.).
51 Pounders v. Day, 151 Miss. 436, 118 So. 298 (1928).
52 Gould v. Town of Newton, 157 Miss. 111, 126 So. 826 (1930).
53 "All questions of negligence and contributory negligence shall be for the
jury to determine." Miss. CODE ANN. § 1455 (1942), Byrnes v. City of Jackson, 140 Miss. 656, 105 So. 861 (1925).
54 See Lee v. Reynolds, 190 Miss. 692, 1 So. 2d 487 (1941) ($100 verdict);
see Dixon v. Breland, 192 Miss. 335, 6 So. 2d 122, 123 (1942) ($200 verdict).
55 See Gulf & S. I. R. R. v. Bond, 181 Miss. 254, 179 So. 355 (1938)
(verdict of $10,000 reduced to $7,500 with remittitur); Tallahala Lumber Co.
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The Mississippi statute is extremely charitable to plaintiffs. So
long as a defendant was negligent in any degree, a plaintiff is always
entitled to some damages. The statute however is so charitable to
plaintiffs, that it is unfair to defendants. One who is more responsible than another in causing his own injury should not be heard to
request compensation-in full, or in part-from that other party.
Georgia
The law of comparative negligence in this state comprises three
statutes. The pertinent portions provide that "... . contributory negligence ... shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such.. ." " plaintiff. However, no recovery of damages
is permitted ". . . where the [injury] is . . . caused by his own negligence . . . , 57 or if the plaintiff ". . . by ordinary care could have
avoided the consequences to himself caused by the defendant's negligence. . . ." 5s At first blush, the latter provision seems to diminish
the efficacy of the mitigated-damage recovery provided for in the first
provision. However, the apparent inconsistency may be reconciled
by the fact that the latter provision bars a recovery only where the
plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury. It
may be noted, upon inspection of the statutes in their entirety, that
the rule of comparative negligence was originally designed to affect
only those actions where a railroad was the defendant. However, by
judicial legislation, it seems that the rule may now be invoked in all
negligence actions. Decisional law is also responsible for the rule
that a negligent plaintiff may not recover where his negligence is
equal to, or greater than that of the defendant.59
In Rogers v. McKinley, 60 the court, in correcting a confusing
and misleading charge to the jury, took the opportunity to explain the prevailing rule of comparative negligence in Georgia.
" . . [W]here there is negligence by both parties which is concurrent and contributes to the injury sued for, a recovery by the plaintiff
is not barred, but his damages shall be diminished by an amount proportioned to the amount of fault attributable to him, provided that
his fault is less than the defendants, [sic] and that, by the exercise
v. Holliman, 125 Miss. 308, 87 So. 661 (1921)

$12,500 with remittitur).

(verdict of $18,000 reduced to

"It is rather difficult for us [the court] to appor-

tion, and we would not undertake or attempt to apportion the negligence of

the parties in any case, unless the case is so plain and the injustice so palpable
that we feel safe in acting, as in this case, in which event we shall not hesitate
to do so." Yazoo & M. V. R. R. v. Williams, 114 Miss. 236, 74 So. 835, 839
(1917) (verdict of $10,000 reduced to $5,000 with remittitur).
56

GA. CODE § 66-402 (1933).

7 Id. § 94-703.
58 Id. § 105-603.

59 See Conaway v. McCrory Stores Corp., 82 Ga. App. 97, 60 S. E. 2d 631
(1950); Southern Ry. v. Watson, 104 Ga. 243, 30 S. E. 818 (1898).
6048 Ga. App. 262, 172 S. E. 662 (1934).
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of ordinary care, he could not have avoided the consequences of the
defendant's negligence after it became apparent or in the exercise of
ordinary care should have been discovered by the plaintiff." 61 It
may be noticed that the phrase, less than the defendant's fault, appearing in the court's statement, appears nowhere in the statutes;
and conversely, the requirement of a railroad as the defendant, appears
2
in the statutes, but no such limitation is mentioned by the court.
It has been held that, irrespective of whether or not the defendant was guilty of negligence, the plaintiff is barred from recovery,
if it appears that, by the exercise of ordinary care, he could have
avoided the consequences of defendant's negligent act. 63 Thus, the
plaintiff's negligence is deemed the sole proximate cause of the injury,
and the defendant's negligence, if any, is relegated to remoteness.
Ordinarily, this question of proximate causation is for the jury to determine; 64 however, in a proper case, the court may rule as a matter
of law 65that the plaintiff's negligence was solely responsible for his
injury.
The courts of Georgia are apparently unusually proud of their
juries, and are thus reluctant to take cases out of their hands, or set
their verdicts aside on appeal. 6 In an interesting case, where a verdict for twelve cents was appealed from on the ground of inadequacy,
the court refused to set it aside, reasoning that where the plaintiff's
negligence was found to be only a shade less than that of defendant,
67
the jury could properly award small damages.
The Georgia law of comparative negligence is desirable in one
respect, viz., that if a plaintiff's fault was slightly less than that of defendant, his recovery of damages is small. The principal weakness
of the statute lies in the unnecessary provision that ".

.

. [i]f the

plaintiff by ordinary care could have avoided the consequences to
himself caused by the defendant's negligence

. ..

", he is not entitled

to recover.68 This is surplusage, and should be deleted as it merely
restates the obvious principle involved in every negligence action, that
if plaintiff's negligence was the sole proximate cause of his injury, he
-1 Id., 172 S. E. at 664.
Therefore, the comparative negligence rule seems applicable to all defendants, and only when a plaintiff's negligence, if any, was less than that of
defendant.
63 Fraser v. Hunter, 42 Ga. App. 329, 156 S. E. 268 (1930) (plaintiff, operating automobile in daytime, collided with defendant's truck, which was
parked in middle of the street).
' McDowall Transport, Inc. v. Gault, 80 Ga. App. 445. 56 S. E. 2d 161
(1949); Southern Stages, Inc. v. Clements, 71 Ga. App. 169, 30 S. E. 2d 429
(1944) ; Pollard v. Heard, 53 Ga. App. 623, 186 S. E. 894 (1936).
65 Fraser v. Hunter, stpra note 63.
66 See, e.g., Evans v. Central of Georgia Ry., 38 Ga. App. 146, 142 S. E.
909, 910 (1928).
62

67

Ibid.

68 GA. CODE § 105-603 (1933).
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may not recover. 69 Its inclusion tends to mislead, and unduly favor
a negligent defendant. In the alternative, if its presence is desired
for the sake of clarity, the counter-doctrine, "last clear chance," which
may be favorable to plaintiffs in similar situations, should be likewise
inserted.
Recommendations
Since the common-law rule of contributory negligence continues
in New York in all its fury, it is hereby submitted that some form
of comparative negligence rule be adopted. By removing the weaknesses, and preserving the desirable features of the foregoing state
laws, the following recommendations are made: Where both parties
have been found guilty of negligence, both proximately contributing
to the cause of a plaintiff's injury, the jury should determine the total
amount of damages that plaintiff has sustained, and then compare the
negligence of the parties, to determine percentage-wise their respective degrees of negligence. If the jury decides that plaintiff's negligence was, in degree, equal to or greater than that of defendant's,
plaintiff should be completely barred from recovery. However, if
plaintiff's negligence was of lesser degree than that of defendant,
plaintiff should be entitled to recover some damages. The extent of
such plaintiff's recovery should be computed by the court pursuant
to the following method: The plaintiff's degree of negligence should
be subtracted from that of the defendant, and the remainder should
be multiplied by the total damages that the plaintiff has sustained.
The resulting product would represent the extent of plaintiff's recovery of damages.
To show the simplicity and effectiveness by which the foregoing
rules may be applied, the following illustration may be of aid:
Assume that the jury found the plaintiff and defendant guilty
of negligence, both proximately contributing to the cause of plaintiff's
injury, resulting in damage to plaintiff to the extent of $1,000. After
comparing the negligence of the parties, the jury determined that
plaintiff was negligent to a degree of 45%, and the defendant to a
degree of 55%. Since plaintiff's degree of negligence is less than that
of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to recover some damages. The
court would compute such damages by subtracting plaintiff's degree
of negligence, from that of defendant. The remainder, 10%, multiplied by the total damages sustained by the plaintiff, $1,000, results
in a product of $100. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
damages of $100.
The barring of a recovery, where a plaintiff has been found
guilty of negligence equal to or greater than that of defendant, would
be reasonable and just, since one who is more responsible for his own
69 See Fraser v. Hunter, 42 Ga. App. 329, 156 S. E. 268 (1930).
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injury than another should not be heard to assert a claim against the
other party for compensation for such injury. Also, there is a reason for the "subtraction" method of measuring plaintiff's damages,
as opposed to the "Wisconsin" method. 70 An illustration may serve
to explain the opposing theories of computation. Assume the plaintiff was 49% negligent and the defendant, 51%. Under the "Wisconsin" method, plaintiff would recover 51% of his total damages,
while under the "subtraction" method, the plaintiff would recover
only 2%. Increase by one per cent the negligence of the plaintiff,
so that plaintiff was 50% negligent, and defendant also 50% at fault.
Here, under both methods, plaintiff would recover nothing. It may
thus be seen, that by a one per cent increase of plaintiff's negligence,
his recovery under the "Wisconsin" method would drop from "51%
of his total damages" to nothing; whereas under the "subtraction"
method, his recovery gradually diminishes from "2% of his total
damages" to nothing. It seems more logical that since a plaintiff's
right to recover under a rule of comparative negligence would start
at this 50% level, his numerical recovery should begin there, and
gradually increase, rather than jump suddenly as under the "Wisconsin" method, from nothing to 51% of the damages. Also, it seems
more equitable that a plaintiff, who is almost equally
at fault with the
7
defendant, should recover only small damages. '
The reason that the court should be required to compute plaintiff's damages is primarily to mitigate the confusing effect that any
rule of comparative negligence would tend to have on juries in general. The less a jury is asked to do, the more efficiently they might
perform the duties that are asked of them.
Conclusion
The strictness and uncompromising nature of the common-law
rule of contributory negligence should be alleviated. The manner in
which this end may be accomplished is herein suggested. 72 It may
be argued by some, that since a comparative negligence rule would
create new plaintiffs, and thus more causes of action, the congestion
prevalent in the courts of New York City would be increased. It
is submitted that this result would not necessarily follow, since defendants would tend to settle the cases with more frequency before
70 Wis. STATS. §

331.045 (1951).

See note 66 supra.
2 A similar plan has been considered by the Committee on Law Reform
for the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (1953).
71
7

Presiding Justice Peck, of the Appellate Division, First Department,
an address, "Report on Justice," delivered to the public on court conditions
the City of New York, suggested the system of trial by judge, with a rule
comparative negligence, to relieve the congestion in the courts caused
plaintiffs' demands for jury trials in personal injury actions.
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they even went to trial. Then again, it may be said that juries and
courts may have difficulty in applying such a rule. This appears to
be a lame excuse for a reluctance to make a justified innovation.
Every law, of necessity, must have a beginning. Usually, beginnings
are tedious. The conquering of difficulties results in success. It is
submitted, therefore, that if justice is sought, the recommendations
suggested herein be considered.

THE STATUTE OF LIDMITATIONS VERSUS TRUST ACCOUNTINGS

Introduction
The "Achilles' heel" of a seemingly perfect case is often a statute
of limitations. No amount of learned and persuasive argument can
prevail in the face of a bar to the action raised by an applicable statute
of limitations. While the statutes themselves are aimed at the accomplishment of impartial justice, since their effect is so devastating
upon a bona fide cause of action, the rules governing their applicability and operation should be consistent and clearly defined. With
regard to those causes of action which are cognizable only at law it
can be said that the requirement of clarity has been generally fulfilled.
On the other hand, the operation of a statute of limitations upon actions within the sphere of equity's jurisdiction is fraught with uncertainty and, in many instances, defies prediction. Nowhere within
the broad scope of equity's influence is the unpredictability and confusion as to the operation of the statute of limitations more apparent
than in the field of trust relationships.
The specific problems to be dealt with herein were chosen for
discussion from the many existing problems merely because they
serve as the best examples of trust relationships in general. References will be made throughout to the "legal statute of limitations"
and to the "equitable statute." The former refers to the applicable
statutes in the Civil Practice Act,' which cover most legal causes of
action, while the latter has reference to Section 53 of the Civil Practice Act. 2
Concurrent Jurisdiction
Where there is concurrent jurisdiction in law and equity over
the subject matter involved, the applicable legal statute of limitations
I N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr §§ 48, 49, 50, 51-a.
2Id. §53.

